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Linear logic is a refinement of classical and intuitionistic logic that provides an 
intrinsic and natural accounting of resources. In Girard’s words [12], “linear logic 
is a logic behind logic”. 
A convenient way to present linear logic is by modifying the traditional 
Gentzen-style sequent calculus axiomatization of classical logic (see, e.g., 
[15,22]). The modification may be briefly described in three steps. 
The first step is to remove two structural rules, contraction and weakening, 
which manipulate the use of hypotheses and conclusions in classical proofs. For 
expository purposes let us concentrate on the treatment of hypotheses. The 
contraction rule states that if a property follows from two assumptions of a 
formula, then that property can be derived just from a single assumption of that 
formula. In effect, this means that any assumption, once stated, may then be 
reused as often as desired. The weakening rule makes it possible to use dummy 
assumptions, i.e., it allows us to carry out a deduction without using all of the 
hypotheses. Because contraction and weakening together make it possible to use 
an assumption as often or as little as desired, these rules are responsible for what 
one may see in hindsight as a loss of control over resources in classical (and 
intuitionistic) logic. This realization is the starting point of linear logic. Removing 
the rules of contraction and weakening produces a linear system in which each 
assumption must be used exactly once. In the resulting linear logic, formulas 
indicate finite resources that cannot necessarily be discarded or duplicated 
without effort. 
The second step in deriving linear logic involves the propositional connectives. 
Briefly, the removal of structural rules just mentioned leads naturally to two 
forms of conjunction, one called multiplicative and the other additive, and 
correspondingly to two forms of disjunction. Viewing the hypotheses as re- 
sources, the proof of a multiplicative conjunction as a conclusion forbids any 
sharing between the resources used to establish each conjunct, whereas the 
additive conjunction requires the sharing of all of the resources. We note that 
unlike this distinction between the two forms of conjunction and disjunction, the 
quantifier rules are the same as in classical logic. 
The third step in the presentation of linear logic involves adding a kind of 
modality: a storage or reuse operator, !. Intuitively, the hypothesis !A provides 
unlimited use of the resource A. A computational metaphor that describes the 
meaning of !A quite well is that “the datum A is stored in the memory and may 
be referenced an unlimited number of times”. (There is also a dual modal 
operator, ?, which is definable from ! using negation. Intuitively, while !A 
provides unlimited creation of A, the formula ?B allows the unlimited consump- 
tion of B.) However, since the basic framework remains linear, such an 
unbounded use is allowed ‘locally’, only at formulas specifically marked with !. 
The resulting logic is remarkably natural and well structured, both from proof- 
theoretic and computational standpoints. The logic is constructive, has the 
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cut-elimination property [12] and interesting semantics [12,13,8,32,7], and 
admits a Curry-Howard style interpretation of proofs as programs [12,23, 
16,1,2,17,18,24]. 
An important impetus toward formulation of linear logic was Girard’s 
discovery that in coherent domains, function type A 3 B could be decomposed as 
where ! is the reuse operator just mentioned above, and -C is linear implication, 
which provides the type of functions that ‘use’ their argument exactly once. 
Subsequently, after formulating the syntax of linear logic, Girard recasts the 
decomposition mentioned above as a conservative, syntactic translation from 
intuitionistic logic into linear logic, compositional on sub-formulas and subproofs. 
Girard’s translation covers the full spectrum of the propositions-as-types para- 
digm: the level of formulas, the level of proofs, and the level of proof reduction 
(cut-elimination steps). Furthermore, this translation extends naturally to first- 
order and second-order logic [12]. 
The possibility of a dramatic improvement over Girard’s translation is indicated 
by the recent results in [25]. One of these results establishes the undecidability of 
(provability in) propositional linear logic. The other result in [25] bearing on 
the present discussion is the PsPAcE-completeness of propositional linear logic 
without the modalities !, ?, i.e., of the multiplicative additive fragment, MALL. 
Statman [33] has shown that propositional intuitionistic logic, indeed, even its 
purely implicational fragment is PsPAcn-complete. Hence a natural question arises 
whether (beyond an immediate Turing reduction) there exists another ‘logical’ 
embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic that does not rely on the 
modalities. 
Let us be realistic. One cannot hope to have such an embedding which would 
be too ‘logical’, because on the one hand, first-order multiplicative additive linear 
logic without function symbols is decidable, basically because of a linear bound 
on the depth of cut-free proofs. On the other hand, first-order intuitionistic logic 
is undecidable (even without function symbols). This is an immediate corollary of 
the negative interpretation of classical logic in intuitionistic logic and the 
undecidability of classical first-order logic (even without function symbols), both 
of which are standard and may be found, e.g., in [22]. Therefore it is impossible 
to have a desired embedding for first-order quantifiers. 
Another, more subtle obstruction to obtaining a very ‘logical’ embedding is the 
discrepancy in complexity on the level of cut-elimination (proof normalization). 
Already for the purely implicational fragment of propositional intuitionistic logic, 
cut-elimination is hyperexponential (the equivalent fact about normalization in 
the simple typed lambda calculus is usually one of the first exercises in a graduate 
course in the subject). In contrast, cut-elimination for MALL is known to be much 
lower, at most exponential. In fact, this is true not just in the propositional case, 
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but also for first-order and for second-order MALL. The required bounds are given 
by the Small Normalization Theorem in [12], see also [27]. Hence a translation 
that preserves normalization of proofs with cut would have to be hyperexponen- 
tial. (However, it may be possible to use an optimized presentation of 
intuitionistic logic such as [20] to give a triple exponential translation that 
preserves normalization of optimized proofs with cut.) 
These results do leave open the possibility of an efficient syntactic translation of 
propositional intuitionistic logic into MALL so that such a translation does preserve 
cut-free proofs of a certain optimized form. In this paper we construct such a 
translation. Our translation is an instance of what Girard terms an ‘asymmetrical 
interpretation’, that is, positive occurrences of formulas are translated differently 
from negative occurrences [15]. It can therefore only be viewed as a translation 
on cut-free proofs, unlike Girard’s symmetric translation of intuitionistic logic 
into linear logic. 
In precise technical terms, the target of our translation is an ‘intuitionistic’ 
version of MALL, presented by two-sided sequents with at most one consequent 
formula. Similar ‘intuitionistic’ versions of various fragments of linear logic are 
considered in relationship to computer science, e.g., in [14,23,6,11,16,1,24]. 
Apart from the foundational interest, we believe that the result of this paper, 
which is theoretical in nature, contributes to the understanding of the role of 
linear logic as an expressive and natural framework for describing control 
structure of logic programs. This logic programming perspective is based on [29]; 
related work is in [19,4,5,3]. Furthermore, our result addresses the issue of 
replacing copying and reuse by sharing as discussed below. 
A first indication that copying and reuse of hypotheses in intuitionistic logic 
might be replaceable by sharing is the contraction-free formulation of intuitionis- 
tic logic, given by the system G3 in Section 80 of [22] (see also the formulation of 
a purely implicational fragment considered in Section E6, Chapter 5 of [9]). A 
similar formulation is given in Section 2 below. We concentrate on the purely 
implicational fragment, which suffices because of the reduction discussed in [33]. 
However, a central role in our approach is played by a further reformulation of 
intuitionistic logic suggested by the methods used in [34] and [31]. The 
corresponding calculus, presented in Section 3 below, is the actual source calculus 
for our translation of cut-free proofs into the ‘intuitionistic’ version of multiplica- 
tive additive linear logic. Our translation is exponential in the implication depth, 
but polynomial on formulas of bounded implication depth. (In fact, it suffices to 
consider only implications of depth at most 2, see, e.g., [30]. This depth reduction 
dates back to [35].) A preliminary version of this work was reported in [26]. 
We would like to thank Jean-Yves Girard, Vincent Danos, Yves Lafont, 
Grigori Mints, and John Mitchell for very stimulating discussions. We are also 
grateful to Grigori Mints for help in investigating the literature and to Vincent 
Danos for pointing out an oversight in the proof of Lemma 5.5 in an earlier 
version of the paper. 
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1. Overview 
We only consider propositional systems of intuitionistic and linear logic. We 
use the following notations that are common to both the intuitionistic and linear 
formalisms: 
li, pi, qi, I;:: propositional literals, 
A,B,C: arbitrary formulas, 
2, r, A: arbitrary finite multisets of formulas, 
TkX: sequent with antecedent r and consequent Z 
We often use the word context instead of antecedent. The linear negation 
operation of MALL is omitted entirely. Note that a sequent is represented in terms 
of two multisets, not sets, of formulas. For the intuitionistic sequent calculi, the 
consequent multiset is either a singleton or is empty. When we speak of a formula 
in a sequent, we are really referring to an occurrence of the formula. A reduction 
is the process of applying a rule to a sequent matching the conclusion of the rule 
in order to generate the corresponding premises. The principal formula of the 
rule is then said to be reduced by the reduction. The occurrence of an instance of 
a rule in a proof is said to be an inference. The proper subformulas of a principal 
formula of a rule that appear in the premises of the rule are called the side 
formulas. A proof is represented as a tree rooted at its conclusion sequent at the 
bottom and with the leaves at the top. Given this orientation, the notion of a rule 
occurring above or below another rule should be clear. 
The main result of this paper is an efficient embedding of the implicational 
fragment of propositional intuitionistic logic (IIL) in the intuitionistic fragment of 
multiplicative-additive linear logic (IMALL). We provide a transformation of an IIL 
sequent o to an IMALL sequent p so that IMALL proves p exactly when IIL proves cr. 
The sequents o and p are then said to be equiprovable. The system IIL is given by 
a fairly standard sequent formulation of the intuitionistic implicational logic 
shown in Fig. 5 in Section 2. These rules are similar to those of Kleene’s G3 [22]. 
The target system, IMALL, is shown in Fig. 10 in Section 4. Note that the rules for 
negation, par, and the constant 0 are absent. Because the presentation is in terms 
of two sided sequents, cut-elimination for IMALL holds despite these omissions. 
Cut-elimination is of course a crucial tool in many of our proofs. 
The main distinction between IIL and IMALL is in their treatment of the structural 
rules. IIL has an explicit rule of contraction and the rule of weakening is implicitly 
built into the I rule. Furthermore, the principal formula of an L 3 rule is copied 
into the premise sequents of each IIL rule. IMALL, on the other hand, has neither 
contraction nor weakening, and expressly forbids the copying of the principal 
formula of any rule into a premise. What IMALL does allow is the sharing of the 
non-principal formulas between the two premises of an additive inference rule. 
The cut rule and the contraction rule of IIL can be shown to be eliminable. In 
order to further bridge the gap between these two systems, it is important to 
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Fig. 1. Proof of H 1 r in IIL where P is 13 r, (p 3 q) 3 1, (q 3 r) 3 q 
establish control over the use of structural rules in IIL proofs so that any copying 
of the principal formulas into the premises is made inessential. Consider the IIL 
proof of the sequent _YZ 1 r in Fig. 1, where 2 denotes IxJ~, (pzaq)xl, 
(4 = I) = 4. 
One clear difficulty in translating that proof into IMALL is that the multiset 2 
appears in every sequent in the proof. In IMALL, a formula can appear as the 
principal formula of at most one inference along any branch of the proof. In the 
above proof, the copying of the principal formula of an inference into the 
premises seems essential. The formulas (p 1 q) ZI 1 and IX r appear twice as 
principal formulas, and in both cases, these duplicate occurrences are along the 
same branch of the proof. We can deal with the duplicate use of 1~ r by 
rearranging the above proof as in Fig. 2. 
The next step is to deal with the copying of the formula (p 2 q) ZI 1. For this 
TP,q,P t 2 I I 
R> 
&p,q,ltl Gp,q,l,rtrL, 
c,P,qbPp> GP,q,lt- r 
L3 
CP,qt r 
C,Pt q 3 r 
R> 
GPtq 
c,P&PIL, 
mp3qR’ 
C,’ C,l,ri- r1 
C,lt r 1, -I 
Fig. 2. Modified proof. 
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A,B,p,qb q= 
B,p,q,lb 1’ B,p,q,l,rb r’c,l 
A,B,p,q,lk r 
A,D,B,p,qf- r 
L31 
A,D,B,pkqd- 
A, D, (q .I r) 3 9, p I- 4 
A,D,whrL, 
A,D,(q>r)>qbp>q 
R3 
Cl-r 
2 
C,* C,l,rE r-i31 
A,C,lk r 
L32 
Fig. 3. ‘Linearized’ proof in [IL* where A isI2r, Bisrxq, Cis(q=rj=q, Disqzl. 
purpose, we modify the L 3 rule of IIL to the following two rules: 
TIP I’, BFC 
Z-,(pxB)tC ‘=’ 
l-, (BxC)t(AxB) r, CkD 
I-, ((AxB)=,C)kD L=2 
We also discard the cut and contraction rules and call the resulting system IIL". 
The advantage of IIL* is that there is no copying of principal formulas.’ An 
antecedent principal formula of the form (A 2 B) 3 C is replaced by the simpler 
formula B 3 C in one of the premises of the L I 2 rule. Let A, B, C, and D label 
the formulas 13 r, r I q, (q I> r) 2 q, and q I 1, respectively. With these new 
rules, the above proof can be transformed to an IIL* proof as in Fig. 3. 
The absence of contraction and the absence of copying of principal formulas in 
IIL* along with the restriction on weakening make it possible to embed [IL* in 
IMALL. This translation is asymmetric, i.e., positive occurrences of formulas in 
sequents are treated differently from negative occurrences. The basic idea is that 
a left implication rule of HL* is translated by a block in IMALL consisting of a -oL 
rule (which accounts for the principal formula) followed by a CBL rule (which 
accounts for the context). For instance, the translation [(p 3 q) II I]- will be 
basically (([(q I l)]-a [(p I q)]+)-+b) @ [I]-. If 2’ abbreviates IX r, (q 3 r) I 
q, the last step in the IIL* proof displayed in Fig. 3 will be translated basically as 
in Fig. 4, where the middle branch will be provable. 
The actual translation is more complicated; it also involves the ‘locks-and-keys’ 
technique from [25] in order to ensure faithfulness. We defer the discussion of 
details until Section 4. 
In summary, we provide a transformation from IIL sequents to IMALL sequents 
by transforming IIL proofs. Our main result is: 
’ Grigori Mints directed our attention to IIL*. Observe that after depth-reduction (see Section 6) 
IIL* provides a direct proof-theoretic explanation for the membership in PSPACE of the decision 
problem for propositional intuition&tic logic. Cut-free proofs in IIL* have a height that is linear in the 
number of connectives in the conclusion sequent. An alternating Turing machine can therefore 
generate and check the proof of a given sequent in a nondeterministic manner within polynomial time. 
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PI-1 Kq 1 w l- KP 1 41+ ; 
PI- I- Kn 1 w-a 3 a+ OR b I- id+ -cL : 
P’l-, (Kq 1 W+b 2 q>l+W I- [VI+ PI-9 VI- I- PI+ $L 
P’l-, (Nq 3 W-+P 3 qN+)-+b> @ VI-I- b-l+ 
Fig. 4. Toward IMALL translation of example. 
Theorem 1.1. IIL can be embedded into IMALL. The embedding preserves the 
structure of cut-free proofs in IIL*. 
IIL proofs are transformed by eliminating any use of the cut and contraction 
rules, permuting the order of the inferences, and modifying the L 2 rule so as to 
eliminate the need for copying. The resulting IIL* proofs can then be embedded in 
IMALL. 
From the logic programming perspective given in [29], the main result of this 
paper addresses the issue of replacing copying and reuse in intuitionistic proofs by 
sharing. We believe that our results, together with [19,4], contribute to the 
understanding of the role of linear logic as an expressive and natural framework 
for describing the control structure of logic programs. 
2. Properties of IIL 
In this section, we present a series of lemmas about IIL that eventually establish 
the eliminability of cut and contraction, the admissibility of weakening, and the 
redundancy of copying in IIL proofs. 
Proposition 2.1 shows that the rule of identity on atomic formulas can be 
extended to all formulas. 
Proposition 2.1. For all IIL formulas A and IIL multisets r, there exists a proof of 
I’, A 1 A in IIL. 
Proof. We build the proof by induction on the structure of A. If A is an atomic 
proposition, the result is immediate. If A is an implication, that is A = A, 3 AZ, 
then we may construct the following deduction: 
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r,Al-B 
I’k(A>B)- 
l-7 A, A I- BContraction 
l?,Al-B 
rkc r, c t- BCut 
I-I-B 
Fig. 5. Rules for IIL. 
The two remaining sequents in the above deduction are provable by 
induction. 0 
Proposition 2.2. For any sequent 2 t-A appearing in any IIL proof of r k B, the 
multiset r is a sub-multiset of 2. 
Proof. By induction on the size of proofs followed by a straightforward case 
analysis on the IIL rules. 0 
This conservation of antecedent formulas in IIL proofs provides the key to the 
elimination of contraction as shown by Propositions 2.3 and 2.4. The size of a 
proof is taken to be the number of inferences in it. 
Proposition 2.3. Given a proof of r, A, A k B of size n in IIL, we can produce a 
proof of r, A 1 B of size n in IIL. 
Proof. From Proposition 2.2, we know that r, A, A appears as a sub-multiset of 
each sequent in the given proof tree. By case analysis on the rules in IIL, we see 
that by replacing r, A, A with r, A everywhere in the derivation, we are left with 
a correctly formed IIL proof of r, A t B. q 
Proposition 2.4. Given a proof of r k A of size n in IIL, we can construct a proof 
of r k A in IIL of size no greater than n that does not employ the contraction rule. 
Proof. By induction on proof size. If the last rule in a derivation is contraction, 
then we simply apply Proposition 2.3 to its premise to achieve a smaller proof of 
the desired sequent. In other cases we appeal to the induction hypothesis. 0 
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Proposition 2.5. If there is a proof of r t A in IIL then there is a proof of r t A in 
IIL that does not employ the cut rule. 
Proof. The argument here is a straightforward adaptation of the cut-elimination 
proof for G3 that appears in [22]. 0 
Proposition 2.6. Any proof of r t A in IIL can be transformed into a proof of 
r k A in IIL that does not employ the contraction or cut rules. 
Proof. By application of Proposition 2.5 and then Proposition 2.4. Note that the 
latter lemma will never introduce cuts into a proof, and thus preserves the 
cut-free nature of proofs. Cl 
Proposition 2.7. Given a proof of r t B of size n in IIL, we can produce a proof of 
I’, A t B of size n in IIL. 
Proof. We simply add the IIL formula A to each sequent in the entire IIL 
derivation. That is, by case analysis on the rules in IIL, we see that adding a 
formula A to the context (left-hand side) of the hypotheses and conclusions of all 
the rules of IIL leaves us with a correctly formed IIL proof of r, A t B. Note that 
the formula A that has been weakened in, never occurs as the principal formula 
of any rule in the resulting proof. 0 
Proposition 2.8. Given a proof of I’, A 3 B, B k C of size n in IIL, we can find a 
proof of r, B t C of size less than or equal to n in IIL. 
Proof. We prove this property by induction on the size of IIL proof. At each step 
we perform case analysis on the last rule applied. 
If the last rule is identity, which is restricted to atomic propositios, we may 
safely remove the formula A 2 B from the context. 
If the last rule applied is RI, Cut, or Contraction, then by induction we have 
our result. 
In the final case of Lx, if some other implication in the context is analyzed, 
then by induction we have our result. If A 3 B is the formula analyzed, then we 
know the derivation is of the form: 
r,AxB, BtA r, A 1 B, B, B k C 
r,AIB,BkC 
L3 
Now applying Proposition 2.3 to the proof of the right-hand hypothesis, we are 
able to obtain a proof of r, A 3 B, B t C which is smaller than the original proof, 
and thus by induction we may assume that A 2 B may be eliminated from the 
context, and we have a proof of r, B t C of size no more than n. 0 
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Proposition 2.9. For all IIL formulas A, B, C the sequent (A I B) XI C !-B 2 C is 
provable in IIL. 
Proof. By the following IIL proof: 
(A=B)=C, B,AtBI 
(A=B)=C, B~(AIB)~= (A=B)=C, B, Cd 
(A=,B)xC, BtC 
L3 
(A=B)=CtB=KRz 
0 
3. IIL and IIL* 
We now introduce an interesting optimization of IIL called ML*, and prove that 
cut-free, contraction-free IIL proofs are easily transformed to proofs in [IL*. The 
proof rules for IIL* are given in Fig. 6. Similar optimizations have been studied by 
others [34,31,20, lo]. 
Note that the identity rule is only applicable to atomic propositions, and that 
weakening is only allowed at the leaves of a proof, i.e., at an application of 
identity. Most important, however, is the property that the principal formula is 
not duplicated in the premises of any of the rules in IIL*. 
Proposition 3.1. Given a proof of r k B of size n in ML*, we can produce a proof 
of r, A t B of size n in IIL*. 
Proof. We simply add the [IL* formula A to each sequent in the entire IIL* 
derivation. That is, by case analysis on the rules in IIL*, we see that adding a 
formula A to the context (left-hand side) of the hypotheses and conclusions of all 
the rules of IIL* leaves us with a correctly formed IIL* proof of r, A t B. Cl 
l?,Al- B 
r I- (A > B)- 
r I- P; ut-C,,, 
r, (Pi 3 B) C- C 
I',(B>C)t-(A>B) r,ck-DL,2 
I',((A>B)>C)t-D 
Fig. 6. Rules for IIL*. 
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Lemma 3.2. Given a proof of r E A in [IL*, a proof of r t-A can be constructed in 
IIL. 
Proof. By induction on IIL* proofs using Propositions 3.1 and 2.9. 0 
The other direction of the equivalence of IIL and ML* is somewhat more 
complicated. Our original argument involved depth reduction (see Section 6.1). 
Here we adapt an argument due to Dyckhoff [lo] by introducing Lemma 3.3 and 
modifying the definition of the weight of a sequent used to justify the induction in 
Lemma 3.4. 
Consider an Lz inference in an IIL proof with a principal antecedent formula of 
the form p xA. Let r t C be the conclusion sequent of the inference. The 
inference is said to be backward if p does not occur in r. A forward proof is one 
with no backward inferences. These names are chosen to be reminiscent of 
forward and backward chaining. 
Lemma 3.3. Any cut-free, contraction-free IIL proof II of size n can be 
transformed to a cut-free, contraction-free forward proof 0 of size no more than n 
with the same conclusion as II 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of the cut-free, contraction-free 
proof 17. 
If the final inference in niis not a backward inference, than we have the result 
immediately by induction. 
If the final step is a backward inference in K7, then we use the induction 
hypothesis to eliminate the backward inferences in the subproofs of the premises. 
This transforms the proof 17 to the form below, where the only backward 
inference is the final one. 
The premise r, p 3 A lp cannot be an axiom since p does not occur in r. The 
final inference in the proof 0, of T,p I A t-p must therefore be an Lx inference 
whose principal formula is either of the form (D I> E) 3 F or of the form q 2 B 
where q occurs in r. In either case, these inferences can be permuted below the 
final inference in fl, as in Fig. 7. 
In Fig. 7, the proof 0; is obtained from 0, by Proposition 2.7 but has the same 
size as 0,. The backward inference with the subproofs O,* and 04 is smaller than 
17 and we can therefore employ the induction hypothesis to eliminate the 
backward inference from it. The resulting proof is therefore free of backward 
inferences and has size no larger than 17. 
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011 012 
02 
I’,p>AkD>E r,p 1 A, F I- P L > 
r,p>Akp I’,PI A,AkC L> 
r,p3AtC 
012 0; 
011 
r,p> A,F~P Cp34:WC L> 
r,pIAtD>E r,pI A,FI- C 
L> 
r,p>AtC 
Fig. 7. Permuting backward inferences. 
The other possibility is that the principal formula is of the form 9 2 B where 4 
occurs in r. In this case the inferences permute similarly, and the resulting proof 
may be seen to be forward by induction, and the fact that q occurs in r. 0 
Lemma 3.4. Given a proof of r t C in IIL, a proof of r k C can be constructed in 
ML*. 
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, we can restrict our attention to forward proofs. We 
proceed by induction, not on the size of the given proof, but on weight(o) for a 
sequent o, as defined in Fig. 8. There are four cases according to the final 
inference in the given proof. 
It is easy to show by induction on the structure of A that if 0 <c <d, then 
O<m(A, c)<m(A, d). 
If the given IIL proof of Tt C is an axiom, then the proof is also an ML* proof. 
If the final inference in the given forward IIL proof is Rx applied to a 
conclusion of the form TkA II B to generate the premise r, A k B, then this 
premise is of smaller weight. We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis to 
the premise to get an IIL* proof of r, A t B from which the IIL* proof of r t A I B 
can be completed by the Rx rule of IIL*. 
If the final inference in the given forward IIL rule is Lx applied to a principal 
formula of the form p 3 B, then r has the form 2, p I B and p must occur in 2. 
weW4Al,...,A,t-C) = ~(Al,i)+...+~(~,,~)+~(~,i) 
m(A=&d) = m(A,d+l)+d*(m(B,d)+l) 
m(p,d) = d 
Fig. 8. Definition of weight. 
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weight(C, (D 3 E) 3 F I- C) - weight(C, E 3 F, D I- E) 
= m((D 3 E) 3 F, 1) + m(C, 1) - m(E 3 F, 1) - m(D, 1) - m(E, 1) 
= m(D,3)+2m(E,2)+2+m(F,l)+l+ 
m(C, 1) - m(E, 2) - m(F, 1) - 1 - m(D, 1) - m(E, 1) 
> 0 
Fig. 9. Example calculation of weight. 
Since p occurs in C, the sequent 2 kp is an IIL* axiom. The nontrivial premise is 
then 2,~ I B, B k C. By Proposition 2.8, the sequent 2, B t C must also have an 
IIL proof and since it is of smaller weight than 2,~ 3 B I- C, the induction 
hypothesis can be applied to it yielding an IIL” proof of 2, B 1 C. The required 
IIL* proof of Z’,p 2 B t- C can be constructed using the L I 1 rule with the 
premises E, B k C and 2 tp. 
If the final inference in the given IIL proof is Lx applied to a principal formula 
of the form (D 2 E) 2 F, then r has the form 2, (D ZI E) 3 F, and we have IIL 
proofs for the two premises .Z, (D xE)xFtDr,E and Z,(DxE)xF, FkC. 
Proposition 2.8 applied to the second premise yields an IIL proof of 2, F k C to 
which the induction hypothesis can be applied yielding an IIL* proof of 2, F t C. 
Since in IIL we can prove D, (E 1 F) k (D 3 E) 2 F and D, (D 3 E) k E, we can 
use the cut rule twice with the sequent 2, (D I E) 2 F t D 3 E to get an IIL proof 
of C, E 3 F, D t E. The difference in weight between this last sequent and the 
original conclusion sequent 2, (D I E) 3 F k C is given in Fig. 9. 
So the induction hypothesis yields an [IL* proof of 2, E 3 F, D k E which by 
Rx yields an IIL* proof of 2, E 3 F 1 D I E. This last sequent with 2, F k C 
yields an IIL* proof of 2, (D ~E)~FtCbytheL~2ruleofnr_*. 0 
The lack of contraction in IIL* makes this formulation of the sequent rules for 
implicational intuitionistic propositional logic amenable to encoding into IMALL. 
4. IIL* t0 IMALL 
An intuitionistic linear logic sequent is composed of two finite multisets of 
linear logic formulas separated by a t, where there is no more than one formula 
in the consequent (i.e., right-hand side) multiset. We assume a set of proposi- 
tional atoms pi to be given. Fig. 10 gives the inference rules for the intuitionistic 
linear sequent calculus, with the slight restriction that the 0 rule is omitted.’ This 
omission does not pose problems for cut-elimination. 
’ Our arguments also apply to the sequent calculus given on p. 53 of [14] without the 0 rule. 
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I PFP 
Cl-A A,rt-A 
C,Il-A 
@IA 
C,A,Bt A Cl-A l?l-B 
C:(A@B)kA C,rt- (ACM) 
-0L 
Cl-A lT,Bl-A &Al-B 
C, I’, (A-oB) I- A C l- (A-oB) 
$L 
&Al-A C,Bl-A Cl-A Ci-B 
E,(A$B) I-- A C k (A&B) 
&Ll 
&Al-A Cl-A 
E,(A&B) t A Et-(MB) 
&L2 
C,BkA Et-B 
E,(A&B) t A Et-(A@B) 
IL It- 
cl- 
cl-1 
1L 
El-A 
C,l l-A l-l 
Cl-T 
Fig. 10. Rules for IMALL. 
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cut 
@R 
-OR 
&R 
$Rl 
$R2 
IR 
1R 
TR 
We now define a pair of mutually recursive translation functions that transform 
any ML* formula into an IMALL formula. k and b are fresh propositional letters. 
The definitions of [ 1’ and [ ]- given in Fig. 11 can be seen to be well defined by 
induction on the size of the formulas. 
For any [IL* sequent r t C we define 
e(r t C) 4 [r]-, k F [Cl+. 
Here [r] - stands for the result of the application of [ ]- to each element of r. 
Note that the ‘key’ k is present in the context of the encoding of a sequent. We 
[A > B]+ : k ~3 ([A]=o(k-o[B]+)) 
[pi]+ i ~@((P;~B+~JT) 
[Pi]- ’ pi 
[pi 3 Al- g k+((k+~[~i]+)-+ @ b)) @ (k @ [A]-)) 
[(A 1 B) 1 cl- 4 k-o((([(B 1 C)]--++(A 3 B)]+))+ @ b)) $ (k @ [Cl-)) 
Fig. 11. Definition of translation. 
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have chosen the notations [ 1’ and [ ]- to suggest the interpretation of positive 
and negative polarity of occurrences. 
Let us first demonstrate how parts of the example IIL* proof given in Fig. 3 are 
translated into IMALL. Consider the sequent E’, (p 3 9) 3 11 r, where 2’ abbrev- 
iates I EJ r, (q 3 r) I q. This sequent has the O-translation [,Y’]-, [(p ZJ s) 2 I]-, 
k t [r]+. By the above definition, 
[(P = 4) = II- = k-o (((I(4 = 1)1--c (kd [(p = q)l+))b (k 6~ b)) @ (k @ V-)). 
In the example IIL* proof given in Fig. 3, the proof of this sequent ends in an 
application of the L 3 2 rule. 
The intuitive structure of the proof in Fig. 12 is as follows. The leftmost 
application of I and the bottommost application of -L correspond to ‘unlocking’ 
the formula of interest. The unlocked formula corresponding to (p 1 q) I I has @ 
as its main connective. The proof tree therefore forks, after a simple application 
of C3L, the rightmost branch can be seen to be the translation of the rightmost 
branch of the IIL* proof. 
The left main branch of the proof progresses by applying the -IL rule. Here 
there is a choice to be made in the way we split the context 2’ among the 
branches of the proof. However, because of the form of our translation, we can 
without loss of generality choose to keep the entire context on the left branch. 
Lemma 4.1 implies that k, b F [r]+, the upper right branch, is provable. Notice 
how [r]+ has been devised to ensure this. And finally, we see that after two 
applications of Rx we are left with the translation of the right-hand branch of the 
IIL* proof. 
In fact, the encoding is such that there are essentially no choices to be made in 
the proof of the IMALL translation that cannot be made in the proof of an IIL* 
formula. For example, once a formula is unlocked with the ‘key’ k, no other 
formula may be unlocked until the unlocked formula is reduced completely, at 
which point it provides another key k. This method of ‘locks and keys’ was 
introduced in [25]. In the next section we show that an IIL* formula is provable in 
[IL* if and only if its translation is provable in IMALL. 
C’, ((1 3 9 I- (P 19) c& L>2 
C’, ((P 3 q) 14 I- p 
u 
FF-2 
WI- > [(q 3 Ol- 9 k I- KP 3 a+ 
PI- 9 KQ 3 Ol- i- k-o[(P 3 q)l+da k,b; [r]+ 
[a]- I- ([(q > !)I-+(k-o[(p > q)]+))+a ‘m’bL PI-,k, [I]- I- b-l+ 
P’l-, (Kq 3 W4J4(p 3 q)l+))-+k @ b) b b-l+ [a]-, k CZJ [/I- t- [r]+@lL 
VI-, (([(q 3 W-o(k-o[(p 3 (r)l+)b4k @ b)) @ (k @ VI-1 k kl+ -0L 
P'l-,k,k4((Kq 3 W-+k-oKp 3 q)l+))*(k @'J)) @ (k @ PI-)) k id+ 
Fig. 12. IIL* and IMALL proofs of example. 
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b1 
Ctl 
mR Al- TTRR 
A,b l- (Pi @ 6) 8 T R 
A, k> b k k @ ((pi $ b) @ T) 
Fig. 13. Case 1 of Lemma 4.1. 
A, [A]-, k, b I- [B]+ 
A, [A]-, b I- k-o[B]+4R 
Ic A, b I- [A]-+(k+?]+)+a, 
A,k,bk k 8 ([Al-+(k-o[B]+)) 
Fig. 14. Case 2 of Lemma 4.1. 
P; 
k I- k* 
f%kpi$b@R AkTTRR 
A,P;k(pi@b)@T R 
A, Pi, k I- k @ ((pi @ b) 8 T) 
Fig. 15. Proof of Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 4.1. For any ML* formula C and any IMALL multiset A, the sequent 
A, k, b t- [Cl’ is provable in IMALL. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the right-hand depth of C. If C =pi is a 
proposition, e can construct an IMALL proof as in Fig. 13. 
In the case that C = (A 3 B) is an implication, we know that B is of smaller 
depth than C, and we can construct the proof as in Fig. 14. q 
Lemma 4.2. For any IIL* proposition pi and any IMALL multiset A, the sequent A, 
[pi]-, k t [pi]+ is provable in IMALL. 
Proof. The proof follows from expanding the definition of [pi]+, as seen in Fig, 
15. q 
5. Completeness of translation 
In order to prove Theorem 1.1, we have to show that the translation is correct 
and faithful, i.e., there exists a cut-free proof of r t C in IIL* if and only if there is 
a cut-free proof of O(r t C) in IMALL. This will be established in two lemmas 
below. 
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[~I-, [Al-‘, k I- PI+ 
[I’]-, [A]- I- ~-o[B]+~~ 
k I- kL [I’]- I- [A]=o(k+I]+)+R, 
@ [r]-,k I- k @ ([A]--+(k-@]+)) 
Fig. 16. Case Rights. 
Lemma 5.1. If there is a cut-free proof of rF C in IIL*, then there is a cut-free 
proof of qrt C) in IMALL. 
Proof. One proceeds by induction on the depth of proof in IIL*. 
In the case that the proof of r I- C is simply one application of identity, C is 
actually a proposition pi (identity is only applicable to atomic propositions in 
IIL*), and therefore r must contain pi as an element. Thus one can use Lemma 
4.2. 
In the case that the proof of r t C ends in an application of the Right1 rule of 
IIL*, then one may simply unlock the conclusion formula and then apply -oR to 
the IMALL translation. Note that by definition, the translation of [A I B]+ is 
k 63 ([A]--a(ki,[B]+)). Th. is case is given in Fig. 16, where the required IMALL 
proof of [r]-, [A]-, k F [B] + is given by the induction hypothesis. 
Suppose that the IIL* proof ends in an application of Left 3 1. Consider the 
proof given in Fig. 17. Lemma 4.1 implies that k, b t [Cl’ is provable, and by 
induction hypothesis there exists IMALL proofs of the other two branches. 
In the final case, suppose that the IIL* proof ends in an application of Left 3 2. 
Consider the proof given in Fig. 18. As in the previous case, Lemma 4.1 implies 
that k, b t [II]+ is provable, and by induction hypothesis there exists IMALL proofs 
of the other two branches. 0 
I l- Pi r,A’W >1 
r,(pi>A)b- 
u 
. 
[ri-, k’t- hi+ k,b t-. [cl+ 
[IJ- 1 k-o~i]+-OR *watL [r]-, k, pi]- k [cl+ 
[rl-, (k+[pi]+)+(k @ 6) I- [Cl+ 
m1 
[JJ-, k @ [A]- I- [Cl+‘iL 
[rl-, ((k-+il+>-+ 8 b)) @ (k 8 [Al-) I- [Cl+ -0L 
[r]-,k, k+(((k*bi]+)+(k @ b)) @ (k @ [A]-)) I- [Cl+ 
Fig. 17. Case Leftxl. 
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[r]-, [(B > C)]- t k-o[(A > B)]+4a k,bF’[D]+ 
[r]- f- ([(B > C)]-+k-o[(A > B)]+))4R k @b t- [D]+‘LL [r]-, k, [Cl- )- [o]+ 
PT- 
[r]-, ([(B 1 C)I--4W(A > B)]+))-4k @a b) k [o]+ [r]-, k @ [Cl- k [D]+oLL 
[r]- t (MB 3 C)I-4k4A 3 Wl+)b(~ 8 b)) @ (k 8 [Cl-) t- P]+ -3L 
[rl-,k,k*((([(B 3 C)]-*(ka[(A > B)]+))*(k @b))@(k@ [Cl-)) k [o]+ 
Fig. 18. Case Left 3 2. 
We now introduce three propositions that simplify the other direction of 
Theorem 1.1. These propositions are mild alterations of lemmas used to establish 
the PsPAcE-completeness of IMALL [25]. Proposition 5.2 is only used to prove 
Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, and the latter two propositions formally state that in a 
cut-free IMALL proof, no lock can be opened before there is a key available at the 
top level. 
Proposition 5.2. For any atomic proposition p, and multiset A not containing the 
constant 1 or the constant 0, if the sequent A tp is provable in IMALL, then A is 
identically p, or contains a positive subformula of the form p &A, A &p, p CI3 A, 
A Cl3 p, or A-p for some formula A. 
Note that the clause about the constant 0 is not actually needed in our 
formulation of IMALL. However, this property could be of interest outside the 
scope of this paper, and thus we state it exactly for full intuitionistic two-sided 
multiplicative-additive linear logic. 
Proof. The argument is by induction on the size of the cut-free IMALL proof. 
For each inductive step, one considers case analysis on the rules of IMALL. 
If identity is the last rule applied, then A =p. 
OR, -OR, @R, and &R do not apply because the right-hand side is an atomic 
propositional literal. 
The IR, IL, and TR rules do not apply because the right-hand side of the 
sequent is an atomic propositional literal. 
The 1L and 1R rules do not apply because A does not contain 1 as a 
subformula. 
If C3L is the last rule applied, then A cannot be p, so the induction hypothesis 
implies that the premise contains a positive subformula of the form p &A, A &p, 
p @A, A @p, or A-op for some formula A. Because all positive subformulas 
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present in the premise of @L are also positive subformulas of the conclusions, the 
result follows. 
If -zL is the last rule applied, the induction hypothesis implies that the context 
of the right-hand premise is identically p, or contains a positive subformula of the 
form p&A, A&p, p @A, A @p, or A-op for some formula A. If it is 
identically p, then the conclusion contains the formula A ap for some A, and the 
result follows. Otherwise, because all positive subformulas present in the context 
of the right-hand premise of -+L are also positive subformulas of the context of 
the conclusion, the result follows. 
If CBL is the last rule applied, the induction hypothesis implies that in each 
premise the context is identically p, or contains a positive subformula of the form 
p &A, A &p, p @ A, A 63p, or A --op for some formula A. If the context of at 
least one premise is identically p, then the conclusion contains the formula A @p 
or p @A fo some A, and the result follows. Otherwise, because all positive 
subformulas present in the premises of @L are also positive subformulas of the 
conclusion, the result follows. 
If &L is the last rule applied, the induction hypothesis implies that the context 
of the premise is identically p, or contains a positive subformula of the form 
p &A, A&p, p @A, A @p, or A-p for some formfula A. If it is identically p, 
then the conclusion contains the formula A &p or p &A for some A, and the 
result follows. Otherwise, because all positive subformulas present in the premise 
of &L are also positive subformulas of the conclusion, the result follows. Cl 
Proposition 5.3. In any cut-free IMALL proof of t3(I t C) the last rule applied must 
be left implication or right tensor. In either case the rule must have k b k as the 
left-hand premise. 
Proof. Given a cut-free IMALL proof of a sequent f9(r I- C), in other words [r]-, 
k I- [Cl’, we need to show that the context [r]- cannot be split in the last rule 
applied. Let us consider which IMALL proof rule can be applied last in the given 
cut-free proof. Investigating the forms of IMALL formulas that can appear in a 
8-translation, one sees that the last proof rule applies must be either-L, @OR, or 
identity. However, even identity cannot apply, because k always appears on the 
left in any @-translation, and k never appears at top level on the right in such a 
translation. Thus there are only two cases to consider, -0L and @R. In either 
case, if any part of [r]- were to be included in the left premise, there could be no 
IMALL proof of that premise, as stated in Proposition 5.2. Cl 
Proposition 5.4. If formula F is a proper subformula of an encoding [ ]- or [ I+, 
respectively, and is not identically k, then F must be reduced below any other 
formula in any IMALL proof of [I]-, F t [Cl’ or [r]- t F, respectively. 
Proof. The proof of this property is almost immediate from Proposition 5.2, 
because our encoding functions [ ]- and [ 1’ have the requisite properties. q 
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Lemma 5.5. If there is a proof of O(r t- C) . in IMALL, then there is a proof of r t C 
in m*. 
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 5.5, one performs cut-elimination on the given 
IMALL proof, and then observes that the resulting proof must be of a very special 
form. In fact, an IIL* proof can be directly read from any such cut-free IMALL 
proof. The action of the ‘locks and keys’ encoded by the positive and negative 
occurrences of k in the IMALL translations forces any cut-free IMALL proof of a 
sequent to have a very specific form. Propositions 5.3 and 5.4 state this formally. 
It is exactly this sort of control over the shape of a proof that one can encode in 
linear logic sequents, but that is impossible to encode in intuitionistic and classical 
logic. The proof of this lemma proceeds by induction on the size of cut-free IMALL 
proof. 
Given a cut-free IMALL proof of a sequent 19(r t C), by Proposition 5.3 the last 
rule applied must be either +IL or @R. In each case one first applies Proposition 
5.3 to establish that the context [r]- must be entirely contained in the right-hand 
premise of the last rule. Then, because there is no k at top level in the right-hand 
premise of the last rule, Proposition 5.4 implies that reducing any formulas in 
[r]- could not lead to a proof. In each case Proposition 5.4 is applied in this way 
several times, forcing the proof to take a specific form. 
First, let us consider the case when @R is the last rule applied in a proof. 
There are two possible forms this formula can take in any 8-translation: 
k C3 ([A]--(k*[B]+)), or k Q?J ((pi @b) 8 T). 
The first possibility would imply that the assumed IMALL proof must take the 
form given in Fig. 16. This proof may be mimicked in IIL* as simply the 
application of RightI, and the hypothesis, which is itself a translation, may be 
mimicked by induction. 
The second possibility would imply that the assumed IMALL proof has the form: 
ktk’ 
[A]- tpi @b [.Z- t T 
[r]-k(p,@b)@T @R 
[r]-,ktk@((p,$b)@T) ‘R 
for some A and ,Z which together make up r. Investigating the left unfinished 
branch, one sees by Proposition 5.4 that pi G3 6 must be reduced. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that this pi @ 6 must be reduced to pi. Proposition 5.2 implies that 
[A]- -pi, and thus [r]- = [Z]-, [p,]-. On the other hand, the right unfinished 
branch could be completed by one application of TR. Whatever its form, one 
may mimic this entire proof in [IL* by an application of identity. 
This completes the analysis in the case that the last proof rule applied is right 
tensor. In the case that the last rule applied is left implication, there are two 
possible forms this formula can take in any f3-translation: 
k* (((k-c [piI+>+ (k @ 6)) @ (k 63 [A]-)) 
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P11-,k: I- [pi]+ _ 
[rl]- I- k+i]+ c-B [r2]-, k @ b I- [CJ+@tL [rl-3 k, [Al- I- [Cl+ 
[rl-, (Wpilt)*(k @ b) I- [Cl+ ]r]-, k @ [A]- I- [c]+@LL 
[rl-, ((Wnlt)4~ @b)) @(k @ Ii]-) k [Cl+ -0L 
[rl-, k, ~4((~~[PiI’)*(k @ b)) CB (k @J [Al-)) k [Cl+ 
Fig. 19. First possibility of -XL. 
and 
k-o ((([(B = C)l- --o (k-o [(A = WI+)) --o (k @J b)) @ (k @ [Cl->>. 
The first possibility would imply that the assumed IMALL proof must take the 
form displayed in Fig. 19, where [G]- and [G]- form a partition of [r]-. (Note 
that this form is almost the same as that in Fig. 17.) Applying the induction 
hypothesis to the leftmost branch in Fig. 19 yields an IIL* proof of 4 tp,. By 
Proposition 3.1 one obtains an IIL* proof of Ttpi. On the other hand, applying 
the induction hypothesis to the rightmost branch in Fig. 19 yields an IIL* proof of 
r, A I- C. Using Left 3 1, one then constructs an IIL* proof of r, (pi I A) t C. The 
middle unfinished branch in Fig. 19 is irrelevant to the translation, but happens to 
always be provable by Lemma 4.1. 
The second possibility would imply that the assumed IMALL proof must take the 
form displayed in Fig. 20, where [&I- and [&I- form a partition of [r]-. (Note 
that this form is almost the same as that in Fig. 18.) Applying the induction 
hypothesis to the leftmost branch in Fig. 20 yields an IIL* proof of G, 
B 3 C t A 3 B. By Proposition 3.1 one obtains an IIL* proof of I’, B 3 C bA 2 B. 
Moreover, applying the induction hypothesis to the rightmost branch in Fig. 20 
yields an IIL* proof of r, C t D. By Left 3 2, one then obtains an IIL* proof of 
r, (A 2 B) I C t D. The middle unfinished branch in Fig. 20 is irrelevant to the 
translation, but is always provable in IMALL by Lemma 4.1. 0 
Remark. The reader will observe that in order to prove Lemma 5.5, in the course 
of the argument given above it sometimes suffices to rely on the general 
permutability properties of IMALL rules instead on Proposition 5.4. However, 
[rll-, [(B 1 C)]-, k I- [(A > B)]+ 
[r>]-,[(B 3 C)]- k k--x[(A > B)]+*R [l-z]-, k,b F [D]+ 
[rl]- L- (KB 3 C)]--4k+[(A > B)]+)) OR [l-z]-, k 8 b I- [D]+@tL [r]-. k, [A]- b [D]+ 
mr 
[r]-, ([(B 3 C)]--o(k-o[(A 3 B)]+))a(k ~3 b) I- [D]+ vi-, k @ [Cl- k [opL, 
[r]-, (([(B 1 C)]-*(kd(A 3 B)]+))-4k @ b)) 6~ (k @ [Cl-) F [II]+ 
[r]-, k, k-4(([(B 3 C)]--o(k+[(A > B)]+))-o(k @b)) &i (k @ [Cl-)) E [D]+ 
4L 
Fig. 20. Second possibility of +JL. 
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using Proposition 5.4 throughout the argument yields a stronger result than 
Lemma 5.5, namely that any cut-free IMALL proof of a &translation must take a 
specific form given above. 
6. Efficiency of transformation 
For any IIL sequent p we have provided an equiprovable IMALL sequent 8(p). 
This encoding into IMALL could be exponential in the size of p, but if p is of depth 
two or less, then B(p) is linear in the size of p. Below we give a depth-reduction 
procedure that takes polynomial time and that produces a sequent E(p) of depth 
at most two, which is only linearly larger than p. The transformation 0(2(p)) 
therefore provides an argument for the PsPAcE-hardness of the decision problem 
for IMALL. The argument for membership of this problem in PSPACE is immediate 
and appears in [25]. 
The transformation from IIL* to IMALL is efficient in another stronger manner. It 
preserves the structure of IIL* proofs. The IMALL translation of an IIL* proof is 
linear in the size of the given IIL* proof. Note that our transformation from IIL to 
IIL* does not necessarily preserve the structure of cut-free proofs in IIL due to the 
permutations that are needed to make copying redundant. Neither of our 
transformations preserves the structure of proofs with cut. 
6.1. Depth reduction in IIL 
An IIL formula of depth one is either an atom p or has the form (pi xpj). A 
formula of depth two is one of the form (pi 3 (pi xpk)), or the form 
((pi Dpj) 3 ok)- G’ tven a sequent r k D, we define E(r I- D) to be the result of 
repeatedly applying any of the set of transformations given in Fig. 21 until none 
of them apply. 
These transformations each reduce the depth of implications, at the expense of 
building a new implication (which is also shallower than the original). Thus this 
sequence of reductions always terminates. Notice that the only kinds of formulas 
I’,(A>B)>(C>D)I-2 
r,p; > ((A II B) > C) I- 2 
r,pi > (A > (B > C)) I- 2 
r,((A 3 B) > C) > p; t 2 
r,(A 3 (B 3 C)) 3 pi k 2 
r t- (A 3 B) 3 (C 3 D) 
r I- pi > (A > (B > C)) 
rl-ppi>((A>B)>C)) 
r t- (A > (B > C)) > pi 
r t- ((A > B) > C)) > pi 
z3(C3D),r,(A>B)>zl-z 
(A 3 B)> z,r,p; > (z > C)l- 2 
z 3 (B > C),r,p; > (A > z) I- 2 
2 3 (A 3 B),I’,(z > C) > pi I- 2 
(B 3 C) IJ s,I’,(A > z) > pi I- 2 
(C>D)32gv-(A>B)>z 
(B>C)>z,I’t-p;>(A>z) 
~:I(AIB),~~~;I(~IC) 
z>(B>C),rk(A>z)>p; 
(A>B)>s,r~(s>C)>pi 
Fig. 21. Definition of 1”. 
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left after the B transformation are of the form: pi, pi lpj, pi I (pi lpk), or 
(pi ~pj) Ipk, where pi, pi, and pk are atomic propositions. Although all the 
formulas appearing are very small, there may be many more of them. This 
technique goes back to [35], see also [30]. 
We define a positive contextual formula, written F+[C], to be a formula with a 
specific occurrence of a subformula C identified, which has positive polarity in the 
formula F. Similarly, a negative contextual formula, written F-[Cl, is one where 
the specific occurrence of a subformula C has negative polarity in the formula F. 
Note that the occurrence specified is unique. That is, even if the formula C occurs 
multiple times as a subformula of F, the occurrence indicated by F+[C] or F-[C] 
is unique. 
Proposition 2.1 readily yields: 
Lemma 6.1. For any IIL formula A, if a sequent involving a proposition pi is 
provable in IIL, then that sequent with pi replaced with A is also provable in IIL. 
The main lemma regarding the soundness of depth reduction relies on the 
following two lemmas, which are easily shown by simultaneous induction on the 
structure of F: 
Lemma 6.2. For all IIL formulas A and B, all IIL multisets r, and positive contexts 
F+[ 1, the sequent T, A 3 B, F+[A] t F+[B] is provable in IIL. 
Lemma 6.3. For all IIL formulas A and B, all IIL multisets l-‘, and negative contexts 
F-[ 1, the sequent r, B 3 A, F-[A] t F-[B] is provable in IIL. 
The soundness of depth reduction follows: 
Lemma 6.4. A sequent r k A is provable in IIL if and only if Z(r k A) is provable 
in IIL. 
Proof. The argument is by induction on the steps of transformation Z applied to 
r k A. Each of the individual transformations may be written in one of four 
forms: 
r, F-[A] t B j r, (A IX), F-[x] t B, 
I-, F+[A] 1 B + r, (x xA), F+[x] k B, 
I-tF+[A] + r, (A~x)tF+[x], 
I’k F-[A] j r, (x IA) t F-[x]. 
In the if direction, assuming we have a proof of the transformed sequent, we 
simply apply Lemma 6.1, and we have a proof of the desired sequent with the 
unpleasant addition of the formula (A 3 A) in the context. Since k(A IA) is 
provable we may cut against this to achieve the desired proof. 
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In the only if direction, there are four cases, although they are all very similar. 
Assuming that there was a proof of r, F-[A] I-B, one simply cuts this against 
the proof of (A I> x), F-[x] t F-[A] g uaranteed by Lemma 6.3, and thus obtains a 
proof of r, (A IX), F-[x] t B. 
Assuming that there was a proof of r, F+[A] t B, one simply cuts this against 
the proof of (X 2 A), F+[x] t F+[A] g uaranteed by Lemma 6.2, and thus obtains a 
proof of T(x 3 A), F+[x] t B. 
Assuming that there was a proof of r 1 F+[A], one simply cuts this against the 
proof of (A 2 x), F+[A] k F+[x] g uaranteed by Lemma 6.2, and thus obtains a 
proof of r, (A IX) t F+[x]. 
Assuming that there was a proof of r k F-[A], one simply cuts this against the 
proof of (X IJA), F-[A] k F-[x] g uaranteed by Lemma 6.3, and thus obtains a 
proof of r, (X I A) t F-[xl. Cl 
For completeness, we state: 
Lemma 6.5. For any intuitionistic sequent p, Z(p) is computable in polynomial 
time and its size is linear in p. 
7. Conclusion 
Linear logic is a refinement of both classical and intuitionistic logic. It admits a 
cut-elimination theorem. An interesting aspect of cut-elimination is that in linear 
logic it is possible to encode constraints on the form of a cut-free proof in the 
conclusion sequent. Linear logic is therefore expressive in a manner that 
intuitionistic and classical logic are not. The classification of the complexity and 
decidability of fragments of linear logic highlights some of this expressiveness 
[25,21]. 
Our embedding of the implicational fragment of propositional intuitionistic 
logic in the IMALL fragment of linear logic provides an alternative proof for the 
PsPAcE-hardness of IMALL. More importantly, it provides insight into the use and 
elimination of the structural rules from IIL through the embedding of IIL into IIL*. 
The system IIL* is an interesting optimization of intuitionistic logic that could be 
useful in theorem proving and logic programming applications [lo, 19,281. 
A number of questions remain open. An extension of our techniques to all 
intuitionistic propositional connectives should be investigated. On the other hand, 
it would be interesting to know whether there is an embedding of intuitionistic 
implication in IMALL that preserves the structure of all cut-free proofs. We would 
also like to know the complexity of cut-elimination for the system IIL* with a cut 
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rule. It is worth examining what transformations uch as depth reduction mean at 
the level of proof terms given by the Curry-Howard isomorphism, and whether 
there are some useful optimizations in the evaluation of proof terms arising from 
such a study. 
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